-Introduction
Active portfolio manager performances are commonly measured relative to a benchmark. This is most often done through a Tracking Error, defined as the standard deviation of the difference between the fund and the benchmark's returns. In such a situation, the fund manager sets a maximum value for the tracking error ex ante and maximizes an objective function such as the fund's expected return 1 . Portfolio selection under a tracking error constraint has been studied in the literature. In particular Roll (1992) and Jorion (2003) have examined the deformation of the efficient frontier due to these tracking error constraints.
Their solution for the constrained optimal portfolio can be expressed as the sum of the optimal portfolio in absence of the tracking error constraint plus a "self-financing" portfolio as defined in Korkie and Turtle (2002) .
Other restrictions on investment policies are commonly found in the contracts between investors and portfolio managers. Some of these restrictions state that the share of certain types of assets should be smaller, higher or equal to a given percentage. This type of restriction is called in this paper a portfolio weights constraint and writes mathematically:
where is a set of restricted securities, x i is the weight in security i and w is the given percentage.
These constraints are often inherent to the fund policy and are often specified in the fund's prospectus. For instance, an industry sector fund mainly invests in its corresponding sector; a fund dedicated to prudent investors may set an upper bound on its stock's holdings or a lower limit on its holdings of governmental bonds and bills; stock funds restrict the share of non stock securities whereas bond and money market funds restrict the stock's share. For instance, US stock funds commonly include in their prospectus an obligation to hold less than 20% of non US stocks. Other funds restrict their investment in foreign securities. In fact, each "investment style" implies explicit or implicit constraints. These constraints appear worldwide and have been documented in the US context in Almazan et al (2004) .
Weights constraints can also be set by regulators. Although some of these regulatory restrictions have been softened in recent years, they still apply in many countries. Regulations are made more explicit in "bank-based" financial markets like in Japan, Germany, France, or Italy where quantitative rules constraining stocks, foreign securities, real estate holdings, derivative securities, restricted stock or private equity as well as other classes of assets are imposed. Some of these regulatory constraints are specific to the fund profile and are often redundant with the prospectus commitments which can be more (but not less) stringent 2 . In addition, funds with tax benefits or tax deferred funds are often subject to weight restrictions.
For instance, in most European countries, ceilings on non European security holdings are imposed 3 . Another regulatory restriction (important, in particular for mutual funds) is on short sales. Although short sales constraints are particular weights constraints, hence our framework applies; we do not directly address them in this paper, mainly because we focus our analysis on the case of a single weights constraint.
Finally, portfolio managers and investors may be obligated to hold shares of a firm during a given period. These lock-in restrictions may be regulatory or non regulatory 4 .
The subject of this article, which is portfolio allocation under benchmarking and weights constraints, has not been studied so far, to the best of our knowledge. However, simultaneous tracking error and weights constraints are often encountered in practice. Indeed, many fund managers, in particular sector fund managers whose performance is compared to the corresponding sectorial benchmark, must satisfy weights constraints imposing a minimum concentration in the corresponding sector.
The first intuition could be that these two constraints are redundant, since the weights constraint imposes a concentration in a particular set of assets while the tracking error constraint imposes a maximum "distance" from an index representing this set. In fact, this first intuition is inaccurate as portfolio managers are often pointing out when complaining that the weights constraint limits their performance. Indeed, we show and explain in this paper that the weights constraint is usually different from the tracking error constraint and that both can be binding, even when the benchmark meets the weights constraint. On the one hand, when the tolerance of the fund manager towards deviation from the benchmark is high enough, by investing in a more diversified portfolio outside the sector, the performance can be enhanced.
For instance, a high tech fund manager compelled to invest at least 90% in high-tech stocks whose performance is assessed towards a high-tech benchmark could eventually obtain a better mean-tracking error trade-off by investing only 70% of the portfolio in the high tech sector. On the other hand, the weights constraint can be met by investing in a portfolio that could be 100% invested in the sector, but with very different weights than those of the index, therefore yielding a high tracking error.
In absence of a weights constraint, the maximum obtainable ex ante Information Ratiodefined as the ratio between the expected excess return and the tracking error (denoted TE) is independent of the level of the TE (see for instance Roll (1992) or Jorion (2003) ). Hence, the Information Ratio (denoted IR) only depends on the ability of the fund manager to generate returns under a TE constraint (whatever the level of the constraint is), hence is a coherent performance measure. We show in this article that this is no longer true in presence of a weights constraint. In particular, an investor optimizing an expected return-tracking error tradeoff under a weights constraint does not necessarily choose the portfolio that maximizes the IR. Moreover, it often occurs that the weaker the TE constraint (the higher the TE allowed), the smaller the optimal IR. These results undermine the relevance of the Information Ratio as a performance measure.
Portfolio optimization, the analytics of the efficient frontier and its computational issues have been extensively studied in the Finance literature. Deviations from the standard framework such as general linear constraints (for instance Markowitz (1959) , Sharpe (1970) ), short sales constraints (for instance Ross (1977) and Dybvig (1984) ), benchmarking (for instance Roll (1992) and Jorion (2003) ), VaR constraints (for instance Alexander and Baptista (2004) in the case of a standard mean-variance framework or Alexander and Baptista (2007) in the case of a mean-tracking error framework), drawdown constraint (Alexander and Baptista (2006) ) mean-variance dynamic rebalancing (for instance Richardson (1989) and Bajeux-Besnainou and Portait (1998)), have also been studied. Our paper differs from this literature in that it addresses portfolio selection under both tracking error and weights constraints.
Section 2 presents the general background and sets up an introductory example involving a weights constraint and the TE constraint.
Section 3 considers the case of an equality weights constraint and section 4 the case of an inequality constraint. In section 5, the loss and the reduction of the IR due to the weights constraint are evaluated, the coherence of the IR is questioned and an alternative performance measure is suggested. A numerical example that illustrates the main results of the paper is developed in section 6. Section 7 is a conclusion.
Background and introductory example
We present in 2.1 some known results about the efficient portfolios meeting a tracking error constraint. We introduce in 2.2 a weights constraint and analyze its implications through a simple numerical example.
Definitions, notations and background results
We consider a portfolio manager who can trade n risky assets (i = 1,…,n) but no risk free asset. The expected returns of risky assets are represented by a n-dimensional vector μ, which i th component is denoted μ i . The variance-covariance matrix (n×n) of the returns on risky assets is V. A bold letter represents a vector or a matrix.' indicates the transpose of a matrix or a vector; 1 is the unit vector with n components equal to 1. We note x a portfolio of risky assets and its corresponding vector of weights and μ x its expected return.
Recall the solutions of the optimization program when the performance is assessed against a benchmark (represented by a portfolio b). When the manager maximizes the expected return with a constraint on the tracking error TE (Roll's problem), or equivalently, when he/she optimizes a mean-tracking error trade-off, his/her optimization program is:
It is convenient to consider the deviation from the benchmark y ≡ x -b and write this program in the equivalent and alternative form:
y V y , with: 1' y = 0.
where y ≡ x -b is a self-financing portfolio 5 (sum of the weights equal to zero), and the benchmark b is the "host portfolio" as defined in Korkie and Turtle (2002) . In the sequel, self financing portfolios are referred as SF, are underlined. In the case of weights summing up to one, the portfolio is called "fully invested" (for instance x is the weights vector of a fully invested portfolio while y is an SF weights vector).
The "multiplier" γ can be interpreted as a "risk aversion" parameter and the constraint states that the sum of the weights is equal to zero.
The self financing portfolio y represents the "active part" of the portfolio management (a purely passive allocation replicates the benchmark b, hence y = 0).
The solution of (T) is well known (see Roll (1992) ) and writes:
(1) is the portfolio that maximizes the Sharpe ratio (with no risk-free asset), or "standard tangent portfolio" (in the Markowitz framework) 6 and:
Since θ is inversely proportional to γ, the "multiplier" θ (which lies between 0 and +∞ for risk averse investors) can be interpreted as a "risk tolerance" parameter. In the following, μ a is assumed positive, which is a standard assumption 7 .
In equations (1), u is self-financing ( More precisely, it follows from (1) that, in the excess return space, the T-portfolios corresponding to positive values of θ are represented by the semi-straight line stemming from the origin (representing portfolio b) with a slope equal to μ u /σ u , where μ u and σ u are respectively the expectation and the standard deviation of the return of u. Moreover, it is also convenient to represent the solutions of (T) corresponding to negative values of θ (inefficient portfolios) by the semi-straight line T' stemming from the origin with a negative slope equal to -μ u /σ u , symmetrical with respect the TE axis , as shown in Figure 1 .
In the sequel, we deal mainly with SF portfolios and all the geometrical figures are represented in the excess return space. 6 In the absolute return space, this tangent is drawn from the origin since there is no risk-free security. 7 In presence of a risk-free asset, μ a higher than the risk-free rate is an equilibrium condition. In absence of a risk-free rate, μ a >0 is the realistic assumption; as pointed out in Green (1986) , a sufficient but much stronger condition is that there is no SF portfolio with a non-negative correlation with all assets.
2.2. The addition of a weight constraint: introductory numerical example.
We present in this section a simple numerical example that illustrates the impact of an additional linear constraint on the tracking error optimization program. This example shows the distortion of the solution and the reduction of the information ratio implied by the constraint. It also reveals a paradoxical consequence of the presence of a weights constraint:
the Information Ratio may decrease when a higher tracking error is allowed.
Assume that three securities are traded, numbered 1, 2 and 3 where 1 and 2 are domestic and 3 is foreign. The benchmark is an equally weighted average of securities 1 and 2. The securities 1, 2 and 3 have expected returns respectively of 10%, 12% and 14%; standard deviations are all equal to 20% and the correlation between any two of them is equal to .5. A portfolio manager is compelled to a tracking error of 5% at most (program (T)). In addition,
we also address the case in which he/she is also constrained to hold at least 90% of domestic assets (program Tracking-error with Inequality Constraint (TIC)). We can then write succinctly:
Max μ x , s.t. TE x ≤ 5% and x 1 + x 2 ≥ 90% where x 1 and x 2 are the weights in securities 1 and 2; μ x is the expected return of the portfolio and TE x is the Tracking error. The objective of maximizing the expected return (or equivalently expected excess return) subject to a TE constraint is naturally associated to the Information Ratio (IR = expected excess return/TE) as a performance measure, which is analogous to the Sharpe ratio associated to the mean-variance optimization program.
The solutions of (T) and (TIC) are represented in table 1.
Solution of (T) 25% 50% 25% 1% 20% This surprising result and its implication on the relevance of the Information Ratio as a measure of a constrained manager's ability to generate expected returns are thoroughly discussed in section 5. In particular, we prove there that optimizing μ under an inequality constraint on TE is equivalent to maximizing IR under an equality constraint on TE (but not under an inequality constraint).
Solution of (TIC) with TE x ≤ 5% 21.55% 68.45% 10% 0.77% 15.40%
Solution of (TIC) with TE x ≤ 8% 5.95% 84.05% 10% 1.08% 13.51% Table 2 In this paper, we generalize this simple example and analyze in a general framework the impact of weights constraints and the corresponding loss in expected returns and information ratios.
Tracking error with an equality weights constraint
Although the case of an equality weights constraint is not frequent in practice 10 , it is a necessary technical step to address the most frequent case of inequality studied in section 4.
After presenting the framework (common to the cases of equality and inequality) we study the analytics and the geometrical representations of the optimal solutions.
Framework and notations
We consider a subset of the n traded assets (for instance the first l securities of the list). is .
10 Lock-in constraints, as mentioned in the introduction, would be an example of an equality constraint.
13
The weight constraint that may be imposed on the fully invested portfolio x states that w x is either equal to a constant w or cannot exceed w Note also that (ic) while written as a "cap-constraint" is equivalent to a "floor-constraint"
on the subset of securities, the "complementary set" of . Hence, without any loss of generality, in the sequel, we consider cap constraints only 12 .
When an equality constraint (ec) is imposed on portfolio weights, which is the case considered in this section, the manager's program writes, for a given value ω :
y V y , with: y 1
The solution of program (TEC-ω) for a given weight ω is an SF portfolio representing the optimal "active part" of the asset allocation and is noted as a TEC-ω portfolio. The solutions of program (TEC-ω) for γ negative ("inefficient" 11 The parameter w is not bounded in our analysis, although, in practise, it would most likely be between 0 and 1 as w <0 would constrain the portfolio to hold globally short positions in the restricted securities; while w >1 would constrain the "unrestricted" securities to be globally held short. 12 Note also that constraints (ec) and (ic) are particular cases of general linear constraints where L 1 would be substituted by any vector of n . It would be a straightforward technical exercise to generalize the results of this paper to a general linear constraint. We choose not to do so, as we cannot think of any financial interpretation coming out of this generalization. portfolios) are referred as TEC'-ω portfolios. In the expected excess return-TE space, TEC ω is defined as the set of points representing TEC-ω portfolios (for a given ω and for all positive θ ) and TEC' ω the graphical representation of portfolios TEC'-ω (θ negative). We prove in 3.3 that TEC ω and TEC' ω are respectively the upper branch and the lower branch of an hyperbola.
Analytical solution of (TEC-ω).
Before deriving the solution of program (TEC-ω), we characterize in Lemma 1 a remarkable SF portfolio, the constrained minimum-tracking error portfolio satisfying the weights constraint. This portfolio, chosen by an investor with an infinite risk aversion γ and compelled to satisfy the constraint
Lemma 1 The weights vector ω z of the constrained minimum tracking error portfolio which solves: Proof: see the Appendix.
13 It is easily shown that k w cannot equal a w except when all assets are restricted; in this case the problem in meaningless.
Note that portfolios s and k are both independent of θ and of the constraint level ω (but not on the list of restricted securities characterized by L 1 ), s is SF and k is fully invested.
Note that s is the constrained minimum tracking-error SF portfolio with a weight w s on restricted assets equal to 1. Besides, it follows from (6) that the minimum-TE portfolios ω z are geometrically represented by two semi-straight lines 14 stemming from the origin (representing the benchmark) and symmetrical around the TE axis, characterized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 1 (proved in the appendix) characterizes the solution
Proposition 1 For any values of θ and ω, the solutions of (TEC-ω) are combinations of two self-financing portfolios u and s (both independent of ω and θ) and write: Equations (7) and (8) and provides for additional expected return at the expense of increasing the tracking error without changing the weight on restricted assets.
Second, the previous decomposition shows a linear and separable impact of any change in the two parameters ω and θ on the solution
Third, (7) implies a two fund separation, the two separating funds being portfolios u and s, which are independent of θ and ω (however, s depends on the list of restricted assets).
Besides, the weights allocated to the two separating funds do not sum up to one, which at first may not seem to be a problem since only self financing portfolios are involved, but actually raises some issues discussed in the interpretation of Proposition 2 of section 3.3. Moreover, the three funds b, s and u are necessary to span all the fully invested portfolios b + * , y θ ω solutions of (TEC), for all values of θ and ω.
Fourth, equation (8) implies that any TEC-portfolio is obtained by adding to the unconstrained optimum portfolio
of the self financing portfolio s. The addition of portfolio s is used to obtain the required weight ω.
Geometrical representation of the solutions of (TEC-ω)
Recall that the solutions * y θ = θ u of the unconstrained program (T) are represented by the two symmetrical semi-straight lines T' and T (as in Figure 1 ). Each T'-T portfolio corresponds to a particular value of θ and has a weight w y θ * on the restricted assets. T'-T is spanned clockwise by increasing θ (the weight in u increases). When θ increases from -∞ to + ∞, w y θ * increases from -∞ to + ∞ if w u > 0, or decreases from +∞ to -∞ if w u < 0.
Since w u is the difference w t -w a between the weights of restricted assets in the tangent portfolio and in the minimum variance portfolio, it may be positive or negative: intuitively, it is positive when the returns of the restricted assets have a high expected value and volatility (more aggressive portfolios contain more restricted assets), and is negative otherwise. Since it is more common to restrict aggressive assets, w u is positive in most circumstances. (Figures 1 and 2 respectively), the two frontiers TEC ω and T (or TEC' ω and T') are tangent at point ω g which represents the unique solution of program (T) with a weight ω on the restricted assets. Indeed, as pointed previously, considering the different portfolios of T'-T when moving clockwise, the corresponding weight w y* increases (when w u > 0), or decreases (when w u < 0), taking all values between −∞ and + ∞. Hence, there is a unique T'-T portfolio with w y* = ω. Since this portfolio solves program (T) and satisfies the weight constraint ω, it also solves (TEC-ω) and therefore is common to TEC ω and T (or TEC' ω and T'). This portfolio called the tangent portfolio and denoted ω g can be characterized using equation (7):
with:
Note that θ ω is the risk tolerance parameter of the unconstrained investor choosing the selffinancing portfolio ω g (which implies a weight ω on restricted assets). Since portfolio ω g is chosen by the unconstrained investor with a risk tolerance parameter θ = θ ω , it is efficient if θ ω ≥ 0 and inefficient (on the lower part of frontier T) otherwise 15 .
Note also that the unconstrained SF optimal portfolio * θ y can be generated by any single fund belonging to the frontier T. Selecting ω g as the generating fund of T and since (from (9) 15 Note that the terms "efficient" and "inefficient" refer here to the mean-tracking error space.
When w u = 0 (Figure 3) , the two branches of the hyperbola generated by the solutions of (TEC-ω) are symmetrical around the TE axis and its two asymptotes are T' and T.
We can now state Proposition 2 which follows directly from equation (8), the definition of θ ω and the composition of ω g :
Proposition 2
When w u ≠ 0, the solution of (TEC-ω) can be written as:
Equation (12) (TEC-ω), for any value of θ, as a combination of two funds ( ω z and ω g ), the sum of the weights allocated to these two funds being equal to 1; these combinations generate an hyperbola. Note that equations (7) and (12) provide two different forms of separation. In a way, (7) is a more general form of separation than (12) since it involves two SF separating funds s and u which are independent of both parameters θ and ω. The two separating funds are therefore common to all investors restricted on the same set of assets, for any value of their risk tolerance θ and of the level ω of their weights constraint. However, as pointed previously, the sum of the two weights in s and u is generally different from 1 and such non convex combinations do not necessarily generate an hyperbola.
There are three possible situations as far as the sign of ω is concerned:
-ω = 0: the benchmark satisfies the equality constraint;
-ω > 0: the benchmark satisfies the inequality weights constraint but not the equality;
-ω < 0: the benchmark does not satisfy the inequality constraint, which is unlikely 16 .
For realistic values (ω ≥ 0), assumed in the rest of the paper, we characterize the set of hyperbolas TEC ω in Proposition 3 (proved in Appendix).
Proposition 3
• For ω > 0 (case represented in Figure 4 ), the set of constrained frontiers TEC' ω -TEC ω , (when ω varies) is a network of hyperbolas characterized by:
-Parallel asymptotes which slopes h and -h are given by: • For ω = 0 (the benchmark satisfies the equality constraint), the constrained efficient frontier TEC 0 is a semi-straight line stemming from the origin, which slope is the same as the slope h of the hyperbolas upper asymptote.
Note that the slope h of the hyperbolas upper asymptotes is lower than the slope of the unconstrained frontier T ( 2 a a u σ μ μ ), which implies that T intercepts the hyperbolas TEC ω (for all ω > 0). 
Tracking error with an inequality weights constraint
In this section, we consider an inequality constraint (ic-ω) ( Recall that w u is the difference w t -w a between the weights of restricted assets in the tangent portfolio and in the minimum variance portfolio and that its sign is probably more often positive than negative although we cannot discard a negative sign.
When w u < 0, since ω ≥ 0 and θ ≥ 0, the condition of equation (16) is always satisfied which means that the weights constraint is always unbinding and that TIC ω is the same as T.
We characterize the TIC-ω portfolios (for θ > 0 and ω > 0) in proposition 4:
Assume ω ≥ 0 and θ ≥ 0.
• If w u > 0 the solution of (TIC-ω) writes: • If w u ≤ 0 , the constraint (ic-ω) is not binding, the unconstrained optimum satisfies the constraint and the solution of (TIC-ω) writes:
The TIC-ω portfolios are represented, in the excess return-TE space, by the frontier T (see Figure 6 ). Note that, when w y* is higher than the ceiling ω, portfolio s is added in order to lower this weight and meet the inequality constraint. When w y* is smaller than ω, the inequality constraint is not binding and the unconstrained optimum * θ y solves (TIC-ω).
Loss assessment, Information Ratios and graphical interpretations
In this section, we evaluate the loss due to the weights constraint and its impact on the Information Ratio and question its legitimacy as a performance measure in presence of a weights constraint.
Two different approaches are possible depending on the considered optimization program: -In the first approach (followed in the previous paragraphs), we consider the optimal trade-off between the expected excess return and the TE for a given individual, characterized by his/her
risk aversion parameter γ and an objective function μ' y -2 γ ' y V y . This is the approach followed in 5.1 where the loss due to the weights constraint is defined as the decrease in the value function due to the constraint.
-In the second approach, which is more relevant for many asset managers, the level TE of Tracking Error is set in the fund's policy and the manager maximizes the expected return under a Tracking Error constraint (in the presence or the absence of a weights constraint).
These two approaches are mathematically equivalent. In 5.2, we follow the second approach and compute the information ratios with and without the weights constraint. The loss L(ω) due to the equality weights constraint (ec-ω) is measured by the decrease in the certainty equivalent excess rate of return. It depends on the risk aversion parameter γ or, equivalently, on the risk tolerance θ and writes:
In the case of an inequality weights constraint, the constraint is either binding and the loss is L(ω), or not binding, and there is no loss. Therefore, we only address the case of an equality.
Proposition 5 (proved in the Appendix) provides a simple expression of this loss:
The loss L(ω) in certainty equivalent return is given by equation (19) and is proportional to the square of the difference between the required weight ω and the unconstrained optimal 
Impact of a weights constraint on the information ratio (IR)
The optimization program of the manager considered in this section writes:
Mean-TE tradeoff:
y Max μ' y , with: ' y V y ≤ TE 2 , with or without (ec-ω) or (ic-ω).
Since the constraint on the tracking error is binding at the optimum we can write this Mean-
TE tradeoff as:
y Max μ' y , with: ' y V y = TE 2 , with or without (ec-ω) or (ic-ω).
We assume that TE ≥ ωσ s (= ω σ z the minimum tracking error obtainable), which is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a solution. The performance of an active asset manager who tries to outperform a benchmark under a TE constraint is often assessed through an Information Ratio IR defined as the Expected excess return divided by the Tracking Error
TE. An alternative definition of the Information Ratio is considered later on.
Since the Information Ratio IR y is equal to μ' y /TE, for any given value of TE the Mean-TE program defined above is equivalent to the following IR-TE maximization program:
Max IR y , with: ' y V y = TE 2 , constrained or not by (ec-ω) or (ic-ω).
This program must be carefully distinguished from the IR-TE trade-off:
y Max IR y , , with: ' y V y ≤ TE 2 , constrained by (ec-ω) or (ic-ω). Indeed, as pointed out in the introductory example and shown in section 5.4., this last program may yield one or an infinity of interior solutions which do not optimize the Mean-TE tradeoff ; in this respect, the Mean-TE and the IR-TE tradeoffs are not equivalent. We consider thus (IR TE ) whose solution will be qualified as the "optimal IR" (from the viewpoint of the mean-TE trade-off).
A binding weights constraint lowers the Information Ratio. The impact of the weights constraint on the Information Ratio is characterized in Proposition 6 (proved in the Appendix). We consider only the most realistic cases when the benchmark satisfies the inequality constraint but not the equality.
Proposition 6
• In absence of a weights constraint, the optimal IR is independent of TE and writes: • In presence of an equality weights constraint, the optimal IR depends on ω and TE:
first increases with TE to its maximum value IR* and then decreases to its asymptotic value h; when w u ≤ 0, it increases asymptotically to h.
• In presence of an inequality constraint, the optimal IR writes: This optimal IR always increases with ω. Recall also that, as stated in Lemma 1, z ω = ω s , s μ and w u have the same sign and that we assume ω > 0. The expressions of s μ and s σ are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 6 has several theoretical and practical implications, in particular on the relevance of the Information Ratio as a performance measure; these implications are studied in 5.3.
Limits of the Information Ratio as a performance measure
Proposition 6 characterizes the relation between the Information Ratio and the Tracking Error.
In absence of a weights constraint, according to equation (20), the maximum Information
Ratio IR* is independent of the level of the tracking error TE set in the fund's policy. This result is also a direct consequence of Roll (1992) and Jorion (2003) analysis, since T ( Figure   1 ) is a semi-straight line starting at the origin and with a slope equal to IR*. It means that the Information ratio IR* of the manager:
-only depends on his/her technical ability;
-cannot be improved with more flexibility by allowing a higher tracking error;
-is a theoretically meaningful tool for comparing the performances of two funds tracking the same benchmark, even if the funds operate under different tracking errors.
In presence of a weights constraint (equality or inequality), according to Proposition 6, the IR chosen by the manager depends on the tracking error TE as well as on ω and . In particular, an individual, managing two different funds constrained by different tracking errors operates under two different Information Ratios. This "duality" prevails even if these two funds track the same benchmark and face the same weights constraint (characterized by the same restricted assets and the same ω). Τherefore, the Information Ratio becomes a spurious exante measure of the technical ability of the fund's manager. It is thus important to stress that, in presence of a weights constraint, it may be theoretically flawed to compare on the basis of their Information Ratios 17 , the performances of two funds operating under different values of ω or TE.
As stated in Proposition 6, the optimal IR increases with ω in the case of an inequality constraint. This intuitive result is easily obtained from program (IR TE ): when relaxing the weights constraint (increasing ω) the value function (optimal IR) increases. This result questions the legitimacy of using IR for comparing the performance of two funds with different constraint levels (and the same TE). However, we focus on the impact of TE on the optimal IR, as it not only challenges the relevance of the IR but also implies a result that may be considered counter-intuitive: the optimal IR may decrease with a less stringent (higher)
Tracking Error. Therefore, we study the optimal IR and its graphical representation as a function of TE (for given and ω), first in the case of an equality constraint and then in the case of an inequality.
• In the case of an equality weights constraint (ec-ω), the dependence between the optimal IR and the tracking error goal is characterized by the function * ω IR (TE), given by (21). Its graphical representation can be interpreted as the efficient frontier in the TE-IR space and depends on and ω. The shape of this efficient frontier depends on the sign of w u , or 17 In fact, the performance measure is an "ex post" or "empirical" Tracking Error R Iˆ, which is an estimator of the "true" but unobservable parameter IR. In addition to the theoretical problem raised in this paper (the estimated parameter IR is not necessarily relevant), well known statistical problems come from the volatility of the estimator ( R Iˆ), which implies that many years are necessary to estimate IR with some confidence. These important statistical problems are beyond the scope of this paper. -If w u < 0 (roughly, if restricted assets are less volatile), the information ratio increases steadily with TE towards its asymptotical value h as shown in Figure 8 . In this case, we get the intuitive result that the optimal Information Ratio increases when a higher tracking error is allowed. This result can be obtained geometrically from Figure 2 . However, it is still questionable to rank different constrained funds on the basis of their Information Ratios, since a higher IR may simply mean that the manager operates under a higher TE.
-If w u = 0, the unconstrained information ratio IR* is equal to the asymptotical value • The case of an inequality constraint (ic-ω) is the most frequently encountered and we only consider a benchmark satisfying this constraint.
-When w u > 0 (Figure 9 ), the optimal Information Ratio is constant and equal to IR* for values of TE lower than TE( ω g ) and decreases towards its asymptotical value h when TE increases beyond TE( ω g ).
Note again that, in the range of TE values where the Information Ratio decreases with TE, it is fallacious to use Information Ratios to assess and compare the performance of different funds if they operate under different values of TE. Besides, we obtain again that the higher the tolerance to deviations from the benchmark, the smaller the optimal IR. We may give the following intuitive explanation of this result: when the weights constraint is not binding the optimal IR is constant and a binding weights constraint decreases its value; but the
weights constraint is relatively more restrictive when the TE bound is larger; hence the optimal IR decreases with TE. Note that in this case, the Information Ratio remains an adequate measure of portfolio performance.
-The case w u = 0 is analogous to the case w u < 0 but with IR* = h.
Note that the solution of y Max IR y , with: ' y V y ≤ TE 2 , constrained by (ic-ω) is indeterminate (as shown in Figure 9 , any (TIC-ω) portfolio with TE ≤ Min(TE( ω g ),TE) solves the program).
An alternative definition of the Information Ratio
Note that two alternative definitions of the Information Ratio and of the Tracking Error are commonly used (see for instance Goodwin (1998) ). In this paper, it is the ratio between the
Expected Excess Return and the Tracking error TE being defined as the standard deviation of the excess return. These definitions (see for example Roll (1992) and Jorion (2003) ), are used respectively as a measure of "global" performance of the portfolio and as a measure of the "distance" to the benchmark. IR measures the global performance (stock picking and market timing due to a beta 18 different from 1) and the associated TE is the "total distance" of the portfolio return to the benchmark return R b . This definition, that does not rely on any factor model is the one used in our paper for different reasons specified hereafter.
An alternative definition of the Information Ratio and Tracking error is based on a regression of the return of the portfolio on the return of the benchmark. IR' is then the ratio of the alpha of the portfolio by the non-systematic risk of the portfolio and TE' is a measure of specific risk: IR' = α/σ(ε) and TE'= σ(ε)
19 . These definitions are broadly used by practitioners and academics, in particular for performance analysis. IR', also commonly called Appraisal Ratio measures the stock picking performance. It is associated with the partial distance to the benchmark TE'= σ(ε). Therefore, it does not account for the excess returns due to leverage (β≠1) that may be interpreted as a consequence of market timing. These two alternative definitions only coincide when β =1.
In our framework, we could have used one definition or another. We chose the first one mainly because it fits better the basic problem at hand: a manager is committed to a maximum "total distance" TE to the benchmark and tries to maximize the expected return by all means (stock picking and betas different from 1). However, substituting R b by βR b , and considering the maximization of α subject to a constrained TE', all of our results hold (βR b can be considered as a "pseudo" benchmark).
18 Defined as the regression coefficient of the portfolio return against the return of the benchmark. 19 When using an index model, ε is the residual noise and α is the "abnormal" return (a la Jensen).
5.5. The Adjusted Information Ratio: An alternative performance measure under tracking error and weights constraints
We look for an alternative and unambiguous performance measure in order to overcome the problem of an optimal IR that varies with the tracking error TE and the constraint level ω.
From equation (7), subtracting the minimum tracking error portfolio ω z to the optimal solution * ,θ ω y of (TEC-ω), we get: The value and the geometrical interpretation of AIR are given in Proposition 7 (proved in the Appendix).
Proposition 7
The Adjusted Information Ratio AIR is equal to the slope of the asymptotes of TEC ω and equal to the asymptotical constrained information ratio:
This result can be related to Figure 4 : the hyperbolas TEC ω have a common slope, independent of ω, which is the IR of the portfolio with an infinite tracking error as well as the AIR. Hence, the asymptotical IR must be equal to the common slope of these asymptotes.
Although this approach is theoretically appealing, the computation of the empirical AIR (which is the suggested "ex post" performance measure) raises a practical problem. Indeed, contrary to the benchmark which is an observable portfolio, the adjusted benchmark is not observable, since the composition of ω z depends on non observable parameters. However, the only unobservable input necessary to construct ω z is the matrix of variance-covariance V (as opposed, for example to portfolio u for which expected returns are also needed) and V can be estimated from historical returns using standard methods. 20 The dependence of the AIR on is not a major problem since, in most cases, the restricted assets are unambiguously related to the benchmark (when the benchmark is a domestic index the restricted assets are the foreign securities, the stock funds are constrained on non stock assets …).
Numerical example
We consider 7 traded securities (or asset classes), corresponding to 5 domestic (
and 2 foreign assets ( f x 1 , f x 2 ). Their expected returns μ and standard deviations σ are: Table 3 The correlations between any two domestic assets as well as the correlation between the two foreign assets are equal to .3. The correlation between a domestic and a foreign asset is equal to .2. The benchmark is an equally weighted average of domestic assets. It follows from standard computation that w u = w t -w a = 15.44%, which is positive.
We consider a portfolio manager in charge of two different funds, with the same benchmark but bound by two different tracking errors respectively equal to 5% and 10%. Program (T)
implies an unconstrained optimal IR (IR*), equal to 23.14%, for any values of θ or TE.
Assume now that in both funds, the sum of the weights on foreign assets is constrained to be smaller than 20%. The optimal allocation for both tracking errors is presented in Table 4 . Table 4 Following first the approach of 5.1 (certainty equivalent excess returns), we consider a given risk tolerance parameter θ. The tracking error of 5% is chosen by a manager with a risk tolerance parameter θ equal to 1.54 (see footnote 8). The decrease in the value function implied by the constraint is given in Proposition 5 (equation (19)). The solution of the unconstrained program (T) yields a value for the objective function equal to .578% (which is a certainty equivalent excess return). When the same portfolio manager is constrained to hold 20% of foreign assets at most, the value function of (TIC-ω) is equal to .566%. It roughly represents a loss of 1.2 basis points in return, which is very small in this example.
Following now the approach of 5.2 (Information Ratios), we consider a portfolio manager solving (T) and (TIC-ω) with a tracking error constraint at a given level TE and assess the impact of the weights constraint on the Information Ratio. Since w u is positive, we are in the situation of Figure 9 : due to the weights constraint, when TE is greater than 4.20% (which is TE( ω g )) and increases, the Information Ratio decreases towards its asymptotical value 8.25%. When the portfolio manager is restricted to a tracking error of 5% at most, the solution of (T) does not satisfy the inequality constraint, which is thus binding for program (TIC).
Then, the solution of (TIC) yields an expected return of 13.30%, which implies a decrease of the Information Ratio from 23.14% to 22.09%. When the tracking error constraint is weakened from 5% to 10%, the optimal Information Ratio decreases about six times more, from 22.09% to 16.08%. As pointed in paragraph 5.3, the Information Ratio is an inadequate measure of performance. Indeed, the same manager ends up with very different values of IR when managing, with the same skills and efforts, different funds constrained by the same restricted assets, at the same level ω.
This example shows also that, even when the impact of the weights constraint on the value function (optimal certainty equivalent excess return) is very small, its impact on the optimal Information Ratio can be very significant. Moreover, the better the return-TE tradeoff (the higher the certainty-equivalent return), the smaller is the IR.
The alternative performance measure, the AIR, is equal to 8.25% for all values of θ (or TE) and ω; it only depends on the manager's skills, not on the constraints levels.
Concluding remarks and extensions
In many situations a minimum concentration in a subset of securities is required and the portfolio performance is assessed against a benchmark often composed of these securities.
This article analyzes the consequences of a weights constraint on benchmarked asset allocation. It presents three different sets of results:
-Separation results: in particular, the active part of all optimal portfolios is a combination of the same two funds u and s for any value of the risk tolerance parameter θ and any level ω of the weights constraint, for a given set of restricted assets .
-The analytics and the geometry of the efficient frontier in the excess return-Tracking Error space: when the weights constraint is not binding, the efficient frontier is linear and hyperbolic otherwise. In case of an inequality constraint, it is thus generally composed of successive linear and hyperbolic segments.
-The influence of the weights constraint on the optimal Information Ratio: in the inequality constraint case, the optimal IR increases when the weights constraint softens (higher ω ) and decreases, in most cases, when TE increases beyond a threshold. Moreover, even when the weights constraint has a very small impact on the certainty equivalent excess return, it can change the IR dramatically. This undermines the appropriateness of the Information Ratio as a performance measure. We suggest an alternative performance indicator, the Adjusted Information Ratio, which avoids most of the theoretical drawbacks of the standard IR at the cost of a more complicated estimation of this performance measure.
The results obtained in this article can be extended in different directions. A first possible extension is the inclusion of a risk-free security among the traded assets. The presence of a risk free asset does not change the results substantially. The unconstrained efficient frontier is again a straight line, but with a higher slope and the constrained frontier is still an hyperbola increases with TE when the latter increases from ) z ( ω TE to infinity.
Finally, in the case of an inequality constraint, the optimal IR increases with ω since it is the solution of program (IR TE ) which itself increases when the tracking error constraint is softened (i.e. when TE increases).
Proof of Proposition 7:
From (A12), we obtain: 
